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1 Introduction
For several years now, citizenship, integration and immigration have been high on 
the agenda of French politicians and public alike. Similar to the situation encountered 
in most Western states, France has known vivid and contested debates around 
issues of immigration and integration, suggesting that its model of assimilationist 
citizenship and the authorities’ confidence in the possibilities of the nation to 
effectively assimilate foreigners and make them  French is starting to fade1. Currently, 
the French president Nicolas Sarkozy has opened a public debate on national 
identity which is supposed to bring the Republican values which are emblematic of 
modern France, back to the masses.2 This exercise of making national identity and 
citizenship once again relevant for the general public has been nevertheless tainted 
with accusations of political manipulation as it more or less took place in advance of 
the local elections organized at the end of 2009. While the initiators of the project 
have tried to deny the relationship between the debate on national identity and issues 
of immigration, the opposition and the press have stressed the conflation of the two 
subjects.
The structural linkage between citizenship, immigration and integration is a 
characteristic not only of this debate, but also of nationality legislation. Sergio Carrera 
has documented how integration has been subject to a gradual expansionist logic 
from its classical venue within the realm of nationality law to the regime covering the 
wider area of immigration.3 Nationality legislation has been changed as to ensure the 
assimilation of the individual concerned and it is presented as the final step of a 
successful process of integration by non-nationals into the privileged status of citizen. 
Becoming a French citizen has been made more difficult by the introduction of 
various tests and requirements4 based on the ideology of assimilationism that
1
It is worth noting that the pertinence and effectiveness of both multiculturalism, as the 
trademark of British integration policies, and assimilationism as the main French approach to 
issues of integration and migration have been heavily questioned in recent years.
2 See, Discours De M. Le Président De La République, Déplacement dans la Drôme, La 
Chapelle en Vercors -  Jeudi 12 Novembre 2009 downloaded from www.elysee.fr;
Haute Conseil à l’integration, Faire Connaitre Les Valeurs De La Republique, Avril 2009, 
http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/RapportHCIvaleursRepq210409.pdf. The Report 
makes interesting reading for several reasons. The national debate launched by Sarkozy on 
the topic of national identity is one which should interest the public at large and one would 
assume that any effort in explaining traditional French values and making them more relevant 
for the citizenry of the 21st millennium should target not only migrants wishing to become 
citizens but citizens alike. However, only migrants are the target group, since for the rest of 
the citizenry this process of understanding is supposed to take place during the school years. 
It is worth mentioning that the report tries to make a difference between the knowledge of the 
said republican values and their understanding and respect (adherence seems not to be 
required if values are respected). This becomes more interesting as the report devotes an 
entire chapter towards the end to several incidents that have taken place during football 
matches during which the French anthem was hissed by members of the audience, while the 
president and other members of government were present. These events are catalogued as 
examples of a part of French youth (of immigrant background) showing a lack of allegiance 
towards the French nation and its values (see, pp. 58- 59 of the Report).
3 Sergio Carrera, In Search of the Perfect Citizen? The Intersection between Integration, 
Immigration and Nationality in the EU, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009 (particularly the 
chapter dedicated to France: The Legal Framework on Nationality, Immigration and “The 
Republican Integration” in France, pp. 291-349).
4 Sergio Carrera, op.cit., p. 295
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requires the citizen-to-be to socialise himself towards the defining republican values 
of the French republic and to at least, formally, become like the prototype French 
citizen. The provisions on loss of French nationality have also undergone changes, 
mainly connected with the strengthening of the legal tools that state authorities can 
use in the fight against terrorism. This report will focus on the last changes 
introduced to the powers of deprivation, the debates that they have generated in 
Parliament and the manner in which they affect the current debates around 
citizenship and identity in France.
2 Nationality law -general remarks
The current nationality legislation in France is part of the larger story of state and 
nation building. In order to understand the implications of the changes brought to the 
regime of nationality attribution, one has to bear in mind the context in which this 
legislation has developed as well as its specificities and complexities. The starting 
point of most discussions on French nationality and citizenship is the French 
Revolution which has been instrumental in conceptualizing the nation as “une et 
indivisible" and therefore, in inventing national citizenship and nationalism5. Since the 
revolution, citizenship and nationality are separate concepts, while political 
understandings of belonging prevail over ethnocultural ones.6 Brubaker argues that 
as a national revolution, the French revolution has brought along a dual 
transformation: the creation of a nation une et indivisible composed of legally equal 
individuals standing in a direct relationship to the state, out of a patchwork of 
overlapping corporate-jurisdictions and the pervasive corporate privilege; and the 
substitution of a militant, mobilized nationalism for the cosmopolitanism, the 
prevailing indifference to nationality of the old regime.7
One of the interesting aspects the period is the perversion of the Revolution’s initial 
cosmopolitan nationalism under a climate of fear and extreme suspicion towards 
strangers which start to be targeted by various repressive measures (a system of 
registration and surveillance, expulsions, imposing special criminal penalties, 
requiring special proofs of civisme etc)8. This leads Brubaker to argue that by 
inventing the national citizen and the legally homogenous national citizenry, the 
Revolution simultaneously invented the foreigner. “Citizen and foreigner would be 
correlative, mutually exclusive, exhaustive categories”.9 What is worthwhile 
mentioning for the topic of deprivation of citizenship, and the possibility of turning 
citizens into foreigners, is Brubaker’s observation that foreigner as a political epithet, 
was applicable also to nationals. The explication lays in the lack of sharp distinctions 
between the legal and political definitions of foreigner, as illustrated by the fact that 
certain “bad citizens” could be redefined as foreigners, as nonbelongers.10 Thus, the
5 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1992, pp. 43 and 35-36.
6 For a more comprehensive description of citizenship and nationality from a historic 
perspective see Brubaker, op.cit., pp. 30-40 and Patrick Weil, How to be French, Nationality 
in the Making since 1789, p.20; Jean-François Berdah, Citizenship and National Identity in 
France from the French Revolution to the Present, in Frontiers and Identities, Pisa University 
Press, 2006, pp. 141-153 (at 142-143).
7 Brubaker, op.cit., p. 43.
8 Idem., p. 45-46
9 Ibidem
10 Idem, p. 46.
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possibility of deprivation appears to be structurally incorporated in the creation of the 
national republican state.
The Revolution marks the breaking point from the nationality policy of the Ancient 
regime, as jus sanguinis replaced jus soli as the main principle for nationality 
acquisition. Jus soli was deemed to be representative of feudal allegiance and as 
such contradicting the ideal of equality before the law and the depiction of the citizen 
as an independent subject.11 Nevertheless, in the 19th century (1851) the need to 
enlarge the population and the pool of military recruits required the return of jus soli 
as the main mode of citizenship acquisition.12 Besides constant debates around the 
principles upon which nationality should be bestowed, the 19th century has also 
witnessed several trends that have left a mark on nationality legislation up to now. As 
such, one should mention the nationalization of race and the racialization of 
nationhood and the extension of jus soli to the second generation of migrants born on 
French soil (while in 1889 the law is changed as to make the third generation 
automatically French if born on French soil). For 100 years the provisions have 
remained more or less in the same form. Weil sees this as a beneficial development 
as it is both a mechanism for granting French citizenship automatically to third 
generation migrants but also the easiest way of proving citizenship for French 
citizens as well (one has to provide the birth certificates of the ancestors).
Automatic acquisition of French nationality by the second and third generation is 
seen by many as the cornerstone of French nationality policy and legislation. It is 
based on an assimilationist ideology that has largely remained intact, despite it being 
challenged various times along the years. Its main argument is that Frenchness is 
acquired and not inherited and in the case of naturalized citizens, it is accompanied 
by a social transformation: “immigrants could be redefined legally as Frenchmen 
because they would be transformed socially into Frenchmen through the assimilatory 
workings of compulsory schooling and universal military service.”13 The current 
debate on national identity, while not directly challenging assimilationism as an 
integration ideology, it does focuses on the manner in which migrants can be 
successfully integrated as to ensure social cohesion. In reality this topic seems to be 
a constant presence on the political agenda and it adds to concerns that nationality 
and immigration have become securitized and politicized topics14. In its current form, 
it is an offspring of the anti-immigrant discourse developed throughout the 1980’s by 
the far right wing party of Jean-Marie Le Pen, the National Front that proposed the 
suppression of automatic acquisition of French nationality by second-generation 
immigrants.15 Under pressure from the National Front and its gaining supporters, the 
center right parties took up the theme during the 1986 legislative campaign and 
ended up proposing to suppress the automatic acquisition of French citizenship. 
Consequently, by the end of the 1980’s and especially on the eve of the 1986 
elections, there was a rise in nationalist discourse which ended with a nationwide 
debate launched by Chirac on the issue of citizenship and migrants. However, the 
instrumentalisation of nationality and immigration discourses and the return to a
11 See, Brubaker, op.cit, p. 90; Patrick Weil and Alexis Spire, France in Rainer Bauböck, Eva 
Ersb0 ll, Kees Groenendijk, Harald Waldrauch (Eds), Acquisition and Loss of Nationality, 
volume 2, Amsterdam University Press, 2006, p. 188 (From now on referred to as NATAC )
12 Brubaker, p. 85-86. p
13 Brubaker, op. cit., p. 109.
14 Carrera, op.cit., p. 302.
15 The motto in the 80’s became “Etre Français, cela ce merité”.
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nationalist discourse should not be pinned entirely on the right wing. The left has also 
used the debate to divert attention from the social and political crisis at the end of the 
1980’s that generated the “falling apart of the grande utopie socialiste” and the social 
problems faced by migrants16.
The comeback of nationalist ideology is explained by several factors. On one hand, 
there was the so-called Algerian crisis in French nationality as a consequence of de­
colonisation and the grievances of second-generation Algerians in France17, and on 
the other hand, what Brubaker describes as “the devaluation, desacralisation, 
denationalization and pluralisation of citizenship” perceived by nationalists defending 
the traditional model of the nation-state.18 According to him, nationalists stress the 
need to re-assert the value and dignity of national citizenship and stressing the idea 
that state-membership presupposes nation-membership. Their demands are either 
that migrants naturalize and assimilate or that they depart. Brubaker argues that in 
reality what nationalists reproach dual nationals is the manner in which dual 
citizenship has led to the devaluation and desacralisation of French citizenship. By 
the desacralisation of citizenship is meant a “general aspect of modern citizenship in 
the West rooted in the emotional remoteness of the bureaucratic welfare state and in 
the obsolescence of the citizen army”19. Yet similar processes of desacralisation of 
citizenship have been documented by other scholars as related to the decline of 
importance of work, war and reproduction for the conceptualization of citizenship20. 
While it is clear that the process of desacralisation or devaluation of citizenship can 
be explained in terms not primarily related to an increase in dual nationality, in the 
French case it seems to be largely associated with a certain manner in which dual 
Algerian-French nationals talked about their dual citizenship. French citizenship was 
described as having a purely instrumental significance. Brubaker emphasizes that 
this approach is not limited to Algerians but in their case it is more visible. This led to 
dual nationals being stigmatized as false citizens, citizens of nowhere21.
One might ask, if indeed this stigmatization of dual nationals can be documented, if it 
also leads to an easier acceptance of rules of deprivation. Since this group of citizens 
is seen with suspicion, their transformation into foreigners is not resisted by the body 
politic per se. What is worth remembering is that the instrumentalization of 
citizenship argument seems to run only against migrants. If we actually consider the
16 Carrera, op.cit., p. 308; Daniel Bélard, Randall Hansen, Reforming the French welfare 
state: Solidarity, social exclusion and the three crises of citizenship, in West European 
Politics, 23:1, pp. 47-64.
17Decolonisation has played its part in shaping France’s migration policy, as the government 
had to deal with the conditions under which former colonial subjects were allowed to enter 
France. Algeria was the most problematic former colony in this respect leading to an 
important attack on the attribution rules in the 1980’s. The Algerian crisis in nationality 
legislation, the desire of certain dual Algerian French nationals to renounce their French 
nationality imposed on them at birth without the possibility of option, came at a time when 
double jus soli was questioned and the far right attempted to appropriate the nationality issue 
on its political platform by pushing the issue of assimilability on the public agenda. For a more 
comprehensive discussion on decolonisation see Weil, How to be French, pp. 152-168.
18 Brubaker, op.cit., p. 143.
19 Idem, p. 145
20 Bryan S. Turner, The Erosion of Citizenship, in The British Journal of Sociology, vol. 52, 
issue 2, 2001, pp. 189-210.
21 Idem, p. 147. The nationalist argument is that citizenship should induce respect for what it 
is rather than calculation about what it entails
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nationality politics pursued by France over the course of its history, it becomes clear 
that liberal naturalization policies have been used as a tool in the expansion and 
strengthening of the Republic and its colonial empire. Yet, similar to the case of the 
UK and its experiences with decolonisation, when migrants try to use to their 
advantage the possibility to reside or naturalize, they are stigmatized for using 
migration or citizenship to achieve security of residence and legal status. In the 
French example this is underlined also by arguments regarding the inassimilable 
character of today’s mainly Muslim migrants, as opposed to earlier Jewish or Catholic 
ones.22 Moreover, Weil shows how while the allegiance and assimilability of dual 
nationals was being questioned in public debates, the government was busy 
“preserving the ties with French emigrants” .23 It is interesting that the loyalty of this 
group is rarely questioned although they are not direct beneficiaries of the 
institutional framework that ensures socialization into French society. They were 
outside the direct reach of the school and army, the traditional French “socializing” 
institutions, not just for migrants, but Frenchmen as well. Here the socializing 
institution is supposed to be the family itself, but since the family has left France it 
can be questioned how far its powers go.
The most visible consequences of this new approach to nationality and immigration 
consist in relatively frequent legislative changes from the 1990s onwards regarding 
nationality attribution and immigration (in 1993, 1998 and 2003) and several general, 
nation-wide debates on nationality and integration all showing a clear nationalist 
tendency24. In 2002, the right wing party of Le Pen returned to power and managed 
to repoliticise nationality and immigration which were presented as the main causes 
of insecurity, instability and criminality inside the country and a threat to the stability 
and cohesion of the French Republic.25 Similar to the 1980s, the political parties on 
the centre have embraced the topic of immigration and its impact on French 
citizenship and identity. This has led to legislative changes in 2003 that have had an 
overall restrictive effect for naturalization26.
22 Idem, p. 49. Although, one might note that the assimilability of Jewish migrants has not 
always been considered that self-evident.
Weil and Spire, op.cit, p. 196
24 The first debate took place after Chirac had won the elections in 1986 and decided to make 
the reform of nationality legislation a priority. A Commission on French Nationality was 
organized that put forward a report on the topic and led the debates on integration. The 
nationality legislation was changed by the Pasqua Law of 1994, the Code of Nationality 
introduced in1945 was abrogated and the nationality provisions reintegrated in the Civil Code. 
According to Weil the 1993 law on nationality was not just a reform of nationality legislation 
but it was part of a larger agenda that aimed at controlling immigration to France. For more 
details see Weil and Spire, NATAC, pp. 200-202.
Currently another debate on national identity is taking place, which seems to be a 
continuation of another debate launched by Sarkozy titled “Qu’est-ce que’etre français”.
25 See Carrera, op.cit., p. 310-315;
26 Weil and Spire, p. 203 Weil and Spire argue that the changes introduced in 2003 to 
naturalization did not attract too much attention. The main explanation is that the law had 
brought much more restrictive changes in other areas of migration law which have been 
picked upon by various NGO’s, activists etc.
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3 Deprivation of citizenship -  any Republican 
logic?
In their current form, the provisions on deprivation of nationality have been 
introduced in French legislation at the beginning of the 20th century, and similar to the 
case of the United Kingdom they are initially connected with the First World War and 
the mistrust towards citizens of enemy origin.27 The Government’s suspicion of newly 
naturalized citizens even led to the formation of an agency dedicated to their 
surveillance under the authority of the Minister of Interior28. The rules on nationality 
attribution were amended and a procedure under the control of the Council of State 
and then of the Supreme Court (2 appeal layers) was introduced. It allowed the 
stripping of French nationality from naturalized persons of enemy origin.29 25000 
persons had their nationality reexamined and 549 men and women of German and 
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman origin lost their French citizenship (Law of 7 April 
1915 and Law of 18 June 1917).
For a short period after the war, the French government returned to a more practical 
and instrumental approach towards immigration as the national interest required the 
increase of the population in an effort to rebuild the country.30 However, because the 
financial situation deteriorated, the debate regarding the conditions for citizenship 
acquisition became hotly debated issues again. In a climate charged with xenophobic 
and nationalist discourses, changes were introduced to the law that prevented newly 
naturalized citizens from exercising certain professions straight ahead after 
naturalization (in1934). In 1938 a law was passed that prevented naturalized citizens 
from voting or being elected in public office for five years; consequently the 
denaturalization provisions were reinforced.31 The discourse becomes dominated by 
the idea that the French state had to be defended against fraudulent naturalizations 
whose increase was predicted due to the introduction of shorter waiting periods. The 
“paper Frenchmen” issue was also gaining popularity as the naturalization rate was 
supposed to be increasing32. At the same time, proposals to withdraw nationality from 
persons recently naturalized who had committed crimes and misdemeanors, most of 
whom were of Levantine or Oriental origin were being put forward.33
27 In France, target groups were Germans, Austrians, Ottomans and residents of Alsace- 
Moselle (members of the last group were even interned in concentration camps). The idea 
was to protect the “true French” who might be false Germans and to protect the country from 
French nationals who might be enemy spies. See Weil, How to be French, p. 60. Similar to 
the UK case, situation of French women married to Germans was also an issue as by 
marrying them they had became German themselves and as a consequence ended being 
interned in camps.
28 Weil and Spire, NATAC, pp. 189-190; Berdah, op.cit., pp.145-146. This agency was 
established in April 1928 but was disbanded after the war stopped.
29 The entire period seems to have been dominated by a mass hysteria regarding Germans 
infiltrated in the heart of French economy and finance systems.
30 The law was changed so that women marrying a foreigner would not lose their French 
citizenship (this proved to be a major cause of loss of citizens); also favourable naturalization 
conditions were introduced.
31 Weil and Spire, op.cit., p. 190.
32 The main worry was that one cannot produce Frenchmen simply by awarding a 
naturalization decree and outraged cries about the inflation of nationality are combined with 
ideas about the selection of migrants based on their ability to be assimilated.
33 See, Weil, How to be French, op.cit., p. 72.
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Besides the 1915 and 1917 laws, it is worth mentioning the law of 1927 that 
introduced the possibility of revocation of nationality targeting cases of disloyalty34 
and the decree law of 21 November 1938 that added unworthiness as a ground for 
revocation. It applied to persons who had committed after their naturalization (in 
France or abroad) a crime or offense leading to a prison sentence of more than one 
year. Revocation was now possible for disloyalty, fraud and unworthiness. From 
1928 to 1939 there had been 16 revocations (261.000 naturalizations).
Weil argues that the extension of the grounds for revocation is connected with the 
change of the waiting period for naturalization, from 10 to 3 years. The 1938 law was 
further changed in 1945 and after World War II 279 revocations were operated 
(1947-1953). Weil argues that since the late 1950’s revocation for disloyalty (any 
French person also having a second nationality) has fallen into disuse, now being 
only one case per year. At the beginning of the cold war, revocations were used 
against naturalized communist militants.35 It is however, interesting to observe that 
the general approach to loss of citizenship was developed at the beginning of the 
century, a time that was dominated by racist and anti-immigrant public discourse and 
measures. Thus we can question whether the extension of the power of the state to 
take away citizenship is connected with the liberalization of the acquisition criteria for 
citizenship or it has to do with the attitude displayed by the authorities and part of the 
public towards foreigners.36
At the beginning of the Second World War the government decided to speed the 
naturalization of the 3 million foreigners present in France in order to use them in the 
war. But during the Nazi occupation and the Vichy regime the issue of naturalized 
citizens was reopened this time with the aim of getting rid of the citizens of Jewish 
origin37. During the Vichy regime, all naturalization that had taken place after 1927 
have been reviewed leading to the denationalization of 15,154 persons.
34 Revocation was possible for having carried out acts inimical to the internal or external 
security of the French state; having committed acts beneficial to a foreign state but 
incompatible with being a French citizen and inimical to France’s interests; having avoided the 
obligations resulting from the laws of recruitment.
35 For more details, see Weil, How to be French, p. 243-244.
36 It is not very easy to separate the two in practice but my point is more that these powers to 
deprive of citizenship are not necessarily the downside of liberal naturalisation policies as 
Weil seems to argue.
37 The Vichy regime and the denaturalisation policy it has enacted have been analysed 
elsewhere. For more detailed discussions on the topic see, Richard H. Weisberg, Vichy law 
and the Holocaust in France, New York University Press, 1998; Daniel C. Kramer, Vichy Law 
and the Holocaust in France by Richard Weisberg, retrievable from 
http://www.amgot.org/kramer.htm; René Levy, Vichy law and the Holocaust in France by 
Richard Weisberg, published on H-Law (October 1997); Maud Mandel, Jews and Gender in 
Liberation France by K.H. Adler published on H-France Review vol. 4, July 2004, no.75; Jean- 
François Berdah, Citizenship and National Identity in France from the French Revolution to 
the Present, in Frontiers and Identities, Pisa University Press, 2006, pp. 141-15; Bernard 
Laguerre, Les Dénaturalisés de Vichy (1940-1944) Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire, Année 
1988, Volume 20, Numéro 1, pp. 3-15, retrievable from http://www.persee.fr; Patrick Weil,
How to be French, op.cit, pp. 100-130
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38 Some authors argue that the Vichy denaturalisations are very different from the 
possibility of denaturalizing citizens under current legislation (or the legislation before 
the Vichy regime, for that matter). Vichy is presented as an abnormal moment in the 
nationality history of France and one not to be repeated. Yet, there are also authors 
who propose a more nuanced view of the Vichy denaturalisations and argue that this 
policy was in fact a continuation of the racially discriminatory policies and measures 
introduced by French authorities after the beginning of the 20th century.39
Laguerre argues that the review of all naturalisations after 1927 and the 
denaturalisations that followed did not operate exclusively on the basis of German 
policy or dictates but rather, they were the expression of a certain idea of what 
France was and who the real French were (“on denaturalise au nom d’une certaine 
idée de la France et des Français”)40. His conclusion that the 22 July 1940 law has 
been applied independently of German policy and that the French government has 
knowingly and willingly engaged in the deportation of thousands of its former 
nationals to the camps after March 1942 is troubling for the understanding of the 
Vichy denaturalisations as an isolated episode in French nationality legislation. Even 
more so is his reminder that the slogan used during one of the more recent debates 
on national identity “Etre Français, cela se mérite” was in fact used by the extreme 
right in the 1930’s racist and xenophobic debates on immigration and its impact on 
national identity, only to be borrowed later on by the Vichy regime to legitimize the 
law on denaturalisation.41
After the fall of the Vichy regime, the laws on denaturalisation adopted during the war 
have been abrogated, but not as easily as one might have imagined.42 All 
denaturalisation dossiers were re-examined and in most cases the denaturalisation 
was annulled.43
This short historical presentation of the provisions on deprivation aims at 
understanding whether or not these powers are structural to the construction of 
modern nationality legislation in France. Undeniably there is a connection between 
the development of this legal framework around denaturalization and the 
liberalization of the naturalization procedure, the increase in the number of 
naturalizations and of dual nationals44. Following this reasoning, an indifferent and 
tolerant policy towards dual nationality requires the possibility of withdrawing of 
nationality in cases of disloyalty or unworthiness as a sort of safety catch. If indeed 
this would be the case, one would expect that countries that do not allow dual
38 The legal framework on the basis of which the Vichy denaturalisation have taken place 
consists of the law of 22 July 1940 that provided for the revision of all naturalisations since 
1927 -  15152 persons lost citizenship on its basis; the law of 23 July 1940 based upon which 
446 persons that had fled France without the authorisation of the Vichy regime have lost 
citizenship and the law of 7 October 1940 based upon which all Algerian Jews have been 
denaturalised.
39 See, Weisberg, op.cit and Laguerre, op.cit
40 Laguerre, op.,cit., p. 9.
41 Idem, p.3, p.14-15.
42 Weil, op.cit., p. 127. Various members of the new auhtorities wanted to maintain the 
denaturalisations effected during the war as they considerd them useful for „purifying“ the 
French nation from elements that could not be easily assimilated (they were not referring to 
Jews as such).
43 For more on this topic, Weil op. cit., p. 131. The exception seems to be the case of active 
collaborators.
44 Weil, op.cit., p. 228
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nationality would have much stricter provisions on deprivation because lack of 
allegiance. This theory remains to be tested. The two countries analysed until now,45 
United Kingdom and France being both tolerant of dual nationality. Loss of 
citizenship because of fraud, is not as such connected with the person’s second 
nationality (one may became stateless if nationality is withdrawn for reasons of fraud) 
and it seems to be accepted as unproblematic in French literature.46 But, bearing, in 
mind what has been said about Vichy, is the power to denaturalize indeed a 
downside of liberal nationalisation policy as Weil suggests? These historical 
examples suggest in my opinion that the deprivation powers inserted in French 
nationality legislation at the beginning of the century (both pre and during the Vichy 
regime) are more the result of racist and xenophobic discourses towards migrants 
that ended up being formalised and institutionalised as law, with devastating 
consequences during the 1940-1944.
4 The current legal framework
Currently, French law distinguishes between perte (loss), applicable to all citizens 
and décheancé (forfeiture, deprivation) applicable only to naturalized citizens. 
Withdrawal of a naturalization certificate is seen as a separate case of loss of 
nationality and it mainly involves cases of fraud.
4.1 Loss of citizenship (Perte) occurs in three situations 
(Article 23 of the Civil Code and its subparagraphs):
- possession o f a fore ign nationa lity (conflict of loyalties) -  The provision is 
applicable only if the person lives abroad; a French person, voluntarily acquiring a 
second nationality, does not lose French citizenship automatically; it has to make an 
express declaration to this extent (Article 23 Civil Code). Nevertheless, this might be 
different for persons acquiring the nationality of one of the countries that have signed 
the Council of Europe Convention of 1963 that aims at reducing the cases of dual 
nationals among the signatories. While in literature this considered to be more of an 
obsolete case of loss47, there has recently been a highly publicized case involving a 
French man married to a Dutch man. The couple was residing in Holland and as a 
manner of showing attachment to his country of residence, the Frenchman decided 
to naturalize in Holland, only to find out that he had lost ex lege his French citizenship 
upon the moment he became Dutch48.
- residence abroad fo r a long period o f tim e (loss of ties with France) -  nationality 
must have been acquired on the basis of jus sanguinis; if it was on the basis of jus 
soli (which requires that 2 generations have been born on French soil) than it is 
considered that the links with France are strong enough. Secondly, the person 
concerned must have never had its habitual residence in France.
45 See previous deliverable on deprivation in the United Kingdom.
46 Weil argues that at the beginning of the 20th century when the provisions of deprivation for 
other reasons than fraud were being contemplated, they were seen as against French legal 
tradition but ultimately their necessity was accepted in the face of the growing number of 
naturalizations. Weil, How to be French, p. 240.
47 Bernard Audit, Droit International Privé, 4emme éditon, Economica 2006, no.1004.
48 P. Weil, A. Pire and C. Bertossi, Country Report: France, in EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 
2009, pp. 16-17; retrievable from http://eudo-citizenship.eu.
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- the behavior o f the citizen (défaut de loyalisme) - the idea behind this case is that 
the French national is behaving like a citizen of a different country towards which 
he/she is also showing the normal allegiance that a French national should show 
towards his/her own country. This case has moral implications and it is seen as a 
sanction. There are two situations covered by this provision: active exercise of a 
foreign nationality and employment in a foreign public service (army, international 
organization to which France does not belong,). In this last case the person 
concerned is not required to posses de jure a foreign nationality. The government 
must first require the person concerned to give up this behavior; there are several 
procedural guarantees such as the approval of the Council of State etc.
4.2 Deprivation of citizenship (Décheancé -  Article 25 of the 
Civil Code and its subparagraphs)
Is applicable only to naturalized citizens and only if they do not become stateless.49 
The aim of this provision is to sanction a lack of allegiance (default of loyalisme) that 
can be identified in various circumstances: conviction for acts against the 
fundamental interests of the Nation, for ordinary or serious offences which constitute 
acts of terrorism, or for crimes that are considered to be crimes against the public 
administration (crimes committed by persons holding a public office), acts of 
insubordination and finally engaging, for the benefit of a foreign state, in acts that are 
incompatible with the quality of French national and acts that are prejudicial to the 
interest of France. In the last case, deprivation can occur in the absence of a court 
judgment (conviction).
All the changes that have been operated recently in respect of the deprivation 
provisions deal with deprivation under Article 25 of the Civil Code. In 2003, loss of 
citizenship was made possible also for facts that had occurred before the person’s 
acquisition of French nationality50. Besides the general safeguard against 
statelessness, the general rule of Article 25 is that the facts imputable to the person 
concerned must have occurred either before acquisition of nationality or within ten 
years after acquisition. Moreover, deprivation can be pronounced only within ten 
years of the perpetration of the facts. However, in 2006 these rules have been 
amended. If the imputable facts are acts o f terrorism  or acts against the 
fundam ental in terests o f the Nation, the time limits are increased from 10 to 15 
years.51 The procedure requires that the person concerned be notified of the 
government’s intention to deprive and be given the opportunity to make observations 
and mount a defense. The order to deprive has to be motivated and the authorities 
can proceed with deprivation only after the favorable opinion of the Council of 
State.52 Loss on the basis of this article operates only for the future.
Based on the last official data published, in 2006 there have been 5 cases of loss on 
the basis of Article 25 of the Civil Code and all of them involved persons convicted for 
acts of terrorism and where possible the person has been expelled and removed
49 This last safeguard was introduced in 1998 (act no 98-170 of 16 March 1998).
50 Law no 2003-1119 of 26 November 2003
51 Law no 2006-64 of 23 January 2006
52 I will come back to these changes in the following section.
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from French territory53. In 2005 and 2004 there were no cases, whereas in 2002 and 
2003 there has been one case in each year.
4.3 Withdrawal of nationality
regulated by Article 27-2 of the Civil Code, is the third main case of loss at the 
initiative of the state and according to statistical data available, the most frequent54. 
The provision is applicable in two types of cases. Firstly, when the naturalisation or 
reintegration in French nationality takes place and the administrative authorities are 
unaware that one of the conditions required for naturalisation or reintegration was, in 
fact, not fulfilled. The typical example seems to be when the person applying for 
naturalisation or reintegration has committed certain acts that would normally lead 
the authorities to deny the request and these acts remain undisclosed.55 According to 
the administrative authorities, the second type of cases covered by this provision 
involves fraud regarding one’s family situation56. By fraud it is understood a voluntary 
misrepresentation of changes intervened in one’s family situation. Most cases seem 
to involve persons applying for naturalisation who do not disclose that in their country 
of origin they are married and their spouse is habitually resident abroad. In case of 
such disclosure, the application would be rejected as it shows that the centre of the 
applicant’s family interests is not France.57 The applicant’s true family situation 
usually comes to light once they ask to have their marriage inscribed in the French 
registry of civil status. Thus, the ministry for foreign affairs alerts the relevant 
authorities within the naturalisation department regarding a possible fraud. The fraud 
is considered to come from the fact that the naturalised spouse has willingly hidden 
the existence of the foreign spouse in order to facilitate his entry into France after his 
own naturalization. The underlying assumption here is that it is easier for French 
citizens to bring a foreign spouse into France than for resident migrants upon whom 
more cumbersome requirements are placed. The procedure does require the 
approval of the Council of State58 and more importantly, it has to take place within
53 Acquisitions et pertes de la nationalité française. Francisations des noms et prénoms 
(Données, chiffrées et commentaries, Année 2006) issued by La Sous-Direction des 
Naturalisations , Ministere de l’Emploi, de la Cohesion Sociale et du Logement, pp. 74.
54 Acquisitions et pertes de la nationalité française. Francisations des noms et prénoms 
(Données, chiffrées et commentaries, Année 2006) issued by La Sous-Direction des 
Naturalisations , Ministere de l’Emploi, de la Cohesion Sociale et du Logement, pp. 75-76
55 Article 21-23 of the Civil Code states that in order to be naturalized one must be of good 
character and must not have incurred one of the sentences expressly refers to in Article 21-27 
(acts of terrorism and acts against the fundamental interests of the Nation). The good 
character requirement in practice means that a persons who has committed acts for which 
more than 6 months of prison are prescribed by law (regardless of whether the crime was 
intentional or not) will be denied naturalization.
56 Acquisitions et pertes de la nationalité française. Francisations des noms et prénoms 
(Données, chiffrées et commentaries, Année 2006) issued by La Sous-Direction des 
Naturalisations , Ministere de l’Emploi, de la Cohesion Sociale et du Logement, pp. 75
57 This is the interpretation given to the provision of Article 21-16 of the Civil Code by the 
administrative courts. The article states that nobody may be naturalised unless he has his 
residence in France at the time of the signature of the decree of naturalisation.
58 When describing the different procedures that can lead to loss of citizenship, most authors 
consider the approval of the Council of State to be an important safeguard. However, one 
should bear in mind that the Council of State most of times has the same opinion as the 
authorities. The fact that deprivation in cases of fraud must take place within certain time 
seems to me a more important limitation, especially if one considers other legislations were 
the authorities are not bound by similar time limits.
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certain time limits. If it is a case of fraud involving misrepresentation, deprivation may 
occur only two years after the fraud has been discovered. In case withdrawal is 
sought because one of the legal conditions that must be met in case of naturalization 
or reintegration was in fact violated, the authorities must act within one year after the 
naturalization decree has been published in the Official Journal.
The latest official data is for 2006 when 817 files have been considered as possibly 
involving a withdrawal case. From 817 files, 32 were sent to the Council of State for 
approval and 27 have been approved. Compared with previous years there was a 
substantial increase in the number of files examined.
2006 seems to have been an extremely prolific year for denaturalization in France 
showing an increase in the number of cases based on terrorist activity as well as in 
fraud cases59. With respect to fraud cases, it is worth stressing the increase in the 
number of files scrutinized by the authorities. This conclusion seems to be consistent 
with the general approach towards immigration and naturalization that has been 
labeled as increasingly securitarian. 60
5 Legislative changes, counter-terrorism and 
immigration
5.1 The 1996 changes
Most of the changes operated to the provisions on loss of nationality at the initiative 
of the state are connected with the fight against terrorism. In 1996, the Act to 
strengthen enforcement measures to combat terrorism and violence against holders 
of public office or public service functions and to enact measures relating to the 
criminal investigation police operated several changes to France’s counter-terrorism 
legislation. Among them, a new ground for deprivation of citizenship was introduced. 
Section 12 of the Act provided that persons having acquired French nationality may 
be deprived of that nationality where they are convicted of a crime or an offence 
constituting an act of terrorism.61
59 For comparison, during 1973-1986 there have been only 3 cases of loss; see André Lebon, 
Attribution, acquisition et perte de la natioanlité française: un bilan 1973-1986 (Revue 
européenne de migrations internationals, 1987, vol 3, no 1, pp7-34)
60 According to a report on counter-terrorism in France published on the server “security and 
society.org” in 2006 France had pursued aggressive counterterrorism measures leading to 
the arrest of 317 people, 140 for links with Islamist terrorism, 150 for attacks in Corsica and
27 for ties with ERA. France authorities have adopted new legislation on the topic, the White 
Paper on terrorism was issued in March2006 and several judicial proceedings have taken 
place against Islamic terrorists. Interestingly enough in May 2006 the government has 
revoked the security clearances of 72 individuals working in private companies at Charles de 
Gaulle international airport because they showed sympathies with Islamic extremists. Some 
of them have challenged the decision and had to be reinstated. The entire report is available 
at http://www.security-society.org/?q=node/494
61 Terrorist acts were defined by the law as, acts done intentionally; in relation to an individual 
or collective act calculated to seriously disrupt law and order by intimidation or terror, to assist 
the unlawful entry, movement or residence of foreign nationals within the meaning of section 
21 of the ordinance of 2 November 1945.
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The constitutionality of some of the measures introduced by the Act has been 
challenged before the Constitutional Court by a group of deputies and senators 62. 
Regarding Section 12 of the Act that introduced the new deprivation ground, the 
deputies have argued that it violates the principle of equality before the criminal law 
and the principle that penalties must be necessary. In their opinion, the fact that the 
perpetrator had acquired French nationality by naturalization or by birth does not 
justify a difference in treatment under the criminal law; moreover, the provision which 
in fact is a penalty provision, was seen as neither necessary nor useful for the 
upholding of public order.
The Government has defended the introduction of the new ground by arguing that it 
did not bring anything new to the existing legislation as deprivation for terrorist acts 
was already covered by the Civil Code since they were crimes for which a penalty of 
minimum 5 years of imprisonment was attached63. In reality, what the provision did 
was to allow deprivation for terrorist acts when the person that committed the act has 
received a sentence of less than 5 years imprisonment. This was considered natural 
and part of the logic of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 25 that identified certain crimes 
for which deprivation can be engaged regardless of the penalty attached to them. 
Moreover, it was argued that the mechanism of deprivation did not contradict any 
principle recognized by the Republic and that the commission of such acts was, in 
itself, a breakage of the republican pact.
The Constitutional Court took the side of the Government and declared the measures 
constitutional. It stated (paras. 22-23) “The principle of equality does not preclude the 
legislature from treating different situations differently nor form derogating from 
equality for reasons of general interest, provided in both cases that the difference of 
treatment in relation to the object of the statute providing for it. In relation to the law 
governing nationality, persons having acquired French nationality and persons who 
enjoy French nationality by birth are in the same situation; however, in view of the 
avowed objective of combating terrorism, it is in order to provide that for a limited 
period the administrative authorities may deprive a person of French nationality 
without the resultant difference in treatment being a violation of the principle of 
equality; given the intrinsic gravity of offences of terrorism, it is not contrary to Article
8 of the Declaration of Human and Civic Rights for the legislature to provide for such 
penalty.” Thus, according to the Constitutional Court the fact that deprivation is 
limited in time saves the measure from being discriminatory.64
5.2 The 2005 changes
The next important amendment was introduced in 2005 with the occasion of a new 
law on the fight against terrorism and it dealt precisely with the extension of the 
limited time, during which the authorities could deprive of citizenship, from 10 to 15
62 Decision 96-377 DC of 16 July 1996.
63 Deprivation was possible under the regime of the previous nationality code under the 
heading of crimes against state security. A variety of laws listed this possibility: the laws of 7 
April 1915 and 18 June 1917; the Law of 10 august 1927 made permanent that possibility of 
deprivation; the Ordinance of 10 October 1945 whose version is closest to the 1996 law; Law 
no 73-42 of 9 January 1973 (deprivation can no longer have a collective effect) and Law no 
93-933 of 22 July 1993.
64 Nevertheless, how limited in time should this possibility be, was not as such assessed by 
the Court. Ten years is limited enough but what about longer periods?
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years. The proposal for a new law on the combat of terrorism was put forward in 
2005 by Nicholas Sarkozy, at that moment minister of interior. It was adopted via an 
emergency procedure and after a very short debate in parliament it became law on 
the 29th of November 2009.65 The law is modeled or tries to borrow elements from the 
British legislation on counter-terrorism; the opposition parties (mainly left wing parties 
and the Greens) have complained that in reality the law is based on the American 
anti-terror legislation and that its approach is the end of liberalism in France66.
The law’s overall effect has been to introduce measures that undermine civil liberties; 
surveillance has been one of the major themes of the law and of the discussions 
surrounding the fight against terrorism. Also, some measures voted with the occasion 
of the law were in fact related to hooliganism and not terrorism as such; this is an 
interesting mix, which can be traced also in the current debates on national identity 
(see the debate on the disrespect showed to the national anthem during football 
matches; in reality only during the matches between France and Algeria which 
makes the debate in reality one about immigration and integration).
Alongside, the liberalization of the legal regime of video surveillance and of the 
control of phone and electronic communications and their retention, the law also 
introduced new possibilities of sanctioning terrorism-related crimes as well as 
introduced the centralization of the jurisdictions in charge of imposing sanctions to 
such crimes and increased the period during which deprivation of citizenship is 
possible. Moreover, it has facilitated identity controls in international trains, 
prescribed the treatment of personal data that might be useful in the fight against 
terrorism and introduced provisions to help fight the financing of terrorist activities 
and a procedure for freezing assets.
Among the changes introduced, was the extension to 15 years of the delay during 
which a person can be deprived of citizenship. The measure is applicable only to 
persons who have acquired citizenship by naturalization, due to marriage to a French 
national or by reintegration in the French nationality. The acts for which deprivation 
can be engaged are conviction for an act that manifestly harms the fundamental 
interests of the Nation, a terrorist act or an act incompatible with the quality of being 
French and which is harmful to the interests of France.
When Sarkozy introduced the law in parliament, he argued that the new provisions 
on deprivation were needed because terrorist networks adopted a strategy of 
territorial implementation: once naturalized as French, activists could no longer be 
subjected to measures of interdiction in France or expulsion; they no longer had the 
obligation to obtain visas for various countries; with other words they were able to 
enjoy all the advantages of being a French citizen. As such, increasing the period 
during which deprivation can be affected was just a matter of counter-acting the 
strategies deployed by terrorist networks. Also 15 years were considered more
65 Several members of the opposition have challenged the emergency character of the law 
but the government has argued that in lights of the terrorist attacks that had taken place that 
year in Spain and the UK, the law had to be adopted immediately. The Government has tried 
to portray the law as being adopted with the consensus of all political parties, but in reality 
there have been various contestations around the main provisions of the law.
66 See, Assemblée nationale, Deuxiémme séance du mardi 29 novembre 2005, p.17
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appropriate as an extra safeguard that the convictions justifying the deprivation order 
would be final.67
The Constitutional Law Commission has scrutinized the new deprivation provisions 
and found them to be sound.68 The Rapporteur, M. Alain Marsaud (a deputy for the 
UMP) argued that deprivation has been seldom used, (at that time, the last 
deprivations had taken place in 2002 and 2003). He found the government’s 
explanation as to the need to increase the period during which deprivation can be 
engaged from 10 to 15 years convincing. It was argued that based on the examples 
furnished by countries that have experienced terrorist attacks, it was possible to 
ascertain that persons that have acquired the nationality of their country of residence 
(presumably opposed to citizens by birth) have been involved in terrorist acts69. The 
extension to 15 years was deemed to be in accordance with the case-law of the 
Constitutional Council that has stated in the past that deprivation can occur only 
within a limited time period. The measure was not disproportionate especially 
considering that the Council recognizes the particular seriousness of terrorist acts.
5.3 Debates in Parliament
During the first round of general debate in the National Assembly, the provisions on 
deprivation have not been among the main points of discussion. The general debate 
has focused on the desired general approach towards terrorism and the best manner 
in which to fight it. The law as such was introduced after attacks in Spain and 
England; France had not had attacks on its soil for some time but it had confronted 
itself with severe turbulences in the banlieux (suburbs). The urgency of the law has 
been justified by the change underwent by terrorism itself. The government has not 
tired to point out that terrorism nowadays was no longer that of the years 70 but an 
inter-state phenomenon that had infiltrated society as such. Also, the government 
insisted that terrorists had changed considerably their methods and special attention 
was devoted to the use of methods of local implementation. Sarkozy talked of a 
phenomenon of depersonalization of the individual and cited the example of a 
Belgian of origin that had traveled with her family to Iraq to become a kamikaze70. 
Against such people, denaturalization was presumably the answer, although in the 
case referred to, it had not been possible. It is not very clear what solution should 
apply to those citizens who cannot be deprived of citizenship (because they lack a 
second one) but who do become radical freedom fighters.
On various occasions during the debates, the opposition has challenged the 
proposed measures as in reality being about the management of illegal immigration, 
disguised as fight against terrorism. It has also been pointed out that at the moment 
when the law was being proposed, the memory of the fights in the suburbs was still 
recent and that in reality these so called counter-terrorist measures would be 
associated by the population with those fights and their destructive effects. Thus, in 
reality, there would be an association made between terrorism and social unrest (and
67 Projet de Loi, relative a la lutte contre le terrorisme et portant dispositions diverses relatives 
a la securite et aux xontroles frontaliers, Assemble Nationale, No 2615, 28 Oct 2005.
68 Alain Marsaud on behalf of the Constitutional Law Commission for the National Assembly, 
Rapport No 2681, 22 November 2005.
6790 Report, p. 86
70 Assemblée nationale, séance du mercredi 23 novembre 2005, p. 24; also Deuxiéme 
séance du mercredi 23 novembre 2005, p. 15).
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by all means, who were the ones protesting if not persons of immigrant 
background?!).
The response of the majority coalition is illuminating as to the manner in which 
French authorities understand the link between terrorism, immigration and nationality. 
They argued that while it is not their intention to draw a connection between 
immigration and terrorism, this seems unavoidable at some point since certain 
groups of immigrant origin undertake frequent trips to certain countries such as Iraq 
or Pakistan. Thus, these suspicious movements justify the access of the information 
services to data and information. 71
Regarding the increase to 15 years of the period during which denaturalization is 
possible, the opposition through the voice of M. Noël Mamère (member of the Green 
party), argued that the measure is useless in the fight against terrorism and 
dangerous since it increases the stigmatizations of certain categories of the French 
population whose attachment to France will always be open to discussion. He 
considered that the measure links terrorism with immigration. Other members of the 
opposition argued that the present provision only complicates matters further, since 
there already was a provision that allowed for deprivation.72 On the other hand, the 
government sustained that the measure was not useless since it allowed for the 
expulsion of the person condemned of terrorist crimes or crimes against the 
fundamental interests of the nation. This is not possible if the person remains French, 
confirming that the real stake is the physical removal of such persons.73
In the Senate, similar arguments have been engaged.74 The opposition parties have 
questioned the dissuasive character of this measure fearing that the main effect of 
the law would be to make a part of the French population suspicious of another part 
and make believe that in France there is a sort of fifth column, an enemy from within 
that is ready any moment to transform itself into a terrorist. This sort of associations 
are stigmatizing for a part of the French citizenry75. They also criticized the fact that 
the same member of the majority that had argued in the Lower House that the 
measure was useful because it allowed the expulsion of those condemned, had been 
previously requesting the deprivation of French nationality from the participants in the 
riots in the suburbs. The representative of the government argued that the measure 
was not trying to change the minds of radicalized terrorist but to protect French 
society by removing from its soil dangerous persons.
It is obvious that French authorities see a direct link between terrorism, migration and 
naturalized citizens. What is interesting compared to the similar debates that have 
taken place in the United Kingdom parliament is that the French government and 
ruling coalition see no problem in putting forward this approach to terrorism that is 
actually pointing the finger towards France’s citizens with an immigrant background.
It is undeniable that this sort of public discourse has consequences for the manner in 
which identity and solidarity are conceptualized in the French public space.
71 Ibidem
72 Deuxiéme séance du jeudi 24 novembre 2005, pp. 51-53
73 The only amendment voted for was one that limited the type of crimes for which the period 
during which deprivation is possible to crimes of terrorism or crimes against the fundamental 
interest of the nation. The category excluded were acts of espionage that did not lead to a 
conviction.
74 Séance du 15 décembre 2005, Journal Officiel de la République Française p. 9713-9714)
75 Ibidem
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6 A real case of deprivation - Adel Tebourski
6.1 General approach to terrorism cases
The previous sections have shown that while deprivation for fraud is numerically the 
most important case of loss of citizenship at the initiative of the state, the provisions 
on loss due to a terrorist conviction are the ones most paraded by the government. 
However, there has been an increase in the number of cases operated on this basis 
as well which requires an explanation.
It is common knowledge that France had developed even before 2001 one of the 
most robust counter-terrorist policies in Europe. This policy is characterized by a 
robust prevention effort and the annihilation of terrorist movements in their very early 
stages (en aval). In 1986, a law was passed that aimed at centralizing in Paris the 
personnel and the jurisdiction in terrorism related cases. The next major reform was 
in 1996 when a new offense was introduced “belonging to a criminal association in 
relation to a terrorist undertaking” (association de malfaiterurs en relation avec une 
enterprise terrorsite) which allows investigating magistrates to detain terrorism 
suspects before they have been linked to any specific act of terrorism that has been 
planned or carried out which has been criticized by various groups for its 
vagueness76. The overwhelming majority of those accused in France of involvement 
in activities related to Islamist terrorism are charged with this offence. The same 
1996 law increased the allowed duration of custody without charge and introduced 
the possibility of deprivation of citizenship for involvement in terrorist activities. In 
2001, the law on daily security (loi du 15 novembre 2001 sur la sécurité quotidienne) 
allowed the use of new information and communication technologies and added gun 
and drug trafficking to the list of terrorist offences. The 2005 law is the last important 
change to the counter-terrorism legislation (discussed above).
The centralization of terrorism related cases in Paris is seen as another important 
aspect of the fight against terrorism.77 Thus, not only the formulation of national 
security strategies, policies and legislation is situated in opaque institutional sites, its 
practical application suffers from the same shortcomings. Only two Paris situated 
courts adjudicate on this issues; a similar process of jurisdictional centralization was 
observable in the UK case study. On the practical manner in which cases are set to 
trial, it has been noted that there is a strong tendency in which material evidence is 
no longer relevant in securing a conviction. The existence of a confession of the 
intentions to commit a crime are enough to secure conviction, regardless of the fact 
that these submissions are frequently obtained in countries where torture is allowed 
(the scenario is that the person is arrested abroad, held in prison and then extradited 
to France where he/she is set on trial using the testimonies offered abroad). As to the 
penalties imposed for such crimes, the latest legislative changes have increased 
penalties to 20 and 30 years respectively. However, it is standard procedure that in 
case of terrorism related offences the judge will pronounce also a complementary 
penalty such as the interdiction to return to France and expulsion which are executed
76 Karyn Agostini-Lippi, Politique anti-terroriste française à la lumière du cas Saïd Arif, p. 1, 
seminaire 16-17 Novembre 2005; In the Name of Prevention, Human Rights Watch, June 5, 
2007, http://www.hrw.org, p.7. This is a minor felony offense defined by the Criminal Code as 
“the participation in any group formed or association established with a view to the 
preparation, marked by one or more material facts, of any of the acts of terrorism” provided 
for in the Criminal Code punishable by up to 10 years in prison.
77 Agostini-Lippi, op.cit., p.5.
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on the same day as execution of the imprisonment sentence is over (there are 
several well known cases where persons after being released at the end of serving a 
prison sentence for a terrorist related crime were immediately removed from French 
soil without the possibility of contesting their destination).
The law of 16 November 2003 changed this so-called double penalty regime, which 
refers to the possibility of expelling foreigners condemned to prison sentences after 
the execution of their penalties. La double peine can take the form of a 
complementary sanction (interdiction to be on French territory) or an administrative 
decision of expulsion. The appeal to this measure does not have suspensive effect. 
One way to try to stop removal is to file an asylum application but usually these are 
rejected78. Asylum claims have a suspensive effect only at first instance, which 
means that after the rejection of the appeal application, the government can expel or 
deport while an appeal is pending, even in cases where there is a fear of persecution 
upon return to the country of nationality, unless a judge grants a stay of execution in 
the specific case.
This situation worries various international bodies. Human Rights Watch considers 
that France’s approach to the expulsion of imams is troublesome as the authorities 
are much more prone to expel a person via an administrative decision than subject 
the person to trial for speech offences or incitement to hatred. As such, they consider 
that the French government is bypassing the more stringent requirements of criminal 
justice by using immigration powers79.
This situation is relevant for our topic since the deprivation of a French citizen of his 
citizenship after the execution of his sentence (provided that he does not become 
stateless) presents similarities with that of the foreigners expelled with the interdiction 
to return to France. In the case of deprived French citizens, the reasoning is that by 
depriving them of citizenship they became expel-able.
6.2 Adel Tebourski
The case of Adel Tebourski is well known and serves as an illustration of how 
deprivation takes place in practice. In 1985 he left Tunisia for Belgium where he 
pursued studies. In 1995 he had married a French national and in 2000 he became a 
French citizen. On 26 November 2001, he was arrested in northern France, following 
the assassination of Ahmed Shah Massoud on 9 September 2001 in Afghanistan. 
Massaoud was the leader of the Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan and was 
assassinated by Abdessatar Dahmane and Bouraoui El Ouaer. Tebourski stood trial 
in 2005 and was accused of having organized the departure of volunteers for 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. His role was confined to procuring false papers such as 
visas and passports. He denied any knowledge of the plans of his friend Dahmane, 
whom he had met during his mathematical studies in Belgium80. On 17 may 2005, 
the Paris Criminal Court sentenced Tebourski to six year imprisonment for “criminal 
conspiracy in connection with a terrorist enterprise” and to deprivation of his civil, 
civic and family rights for a period of five years. However, he did receive a remission
78 Persons involved in terrorism acts come under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention and 
are denied refugee status. However, protection from non-refoulement might still come into 
play.
See, HRW Report, op.cit., p. 4
80 At his trial he has claimed that he helped the assassins to travel to Afghanistan to volunteer 
in civil activities and had no clue as to their real purposes.
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of sentence for good behaviour and was released on 22 July 2006 from Nantes 
prison (his release in 2006 is explained by the fact that he had been imprisoned since 
his arrest in 2001). Three days before his release, on the 19th of July 2006 Tebourski 
is deprived of his French citizenship and was served the same day with a ministerial 
(administrative) deportation order motivated by “the imperative requirements of State 
security and public safety”. One could ask how is it possible for a person to be 
released earlier from prison because of good behaviour yet at the same time to 
constitute a serious threat to state security and public safety as to justify his 
immediate removal from state territory.
After his prison release he was immediately taken to an administrative detention 
centre in order to be removed from French territory to Tunisia, the country of his 
(now) only nationality. Tebourski has launched several appeals to the administrative 
removal order, as well as an application for asylum, which was denied. He tried to 
appeal the designation of Tunisia as his country of deportation. The appeal to the 
decision of the French Office of Refugees and Stateless Persons with the Refugee 
Appeals Board did not have suspensive effect and on 7 August 2006 he was 
deported to Tunisia, despite several applications for interim relief launched 
previously. On 17 October 2006 the Refugee Appeals Board passed judgment on his 
appeal against the rejection of his asylum application. Having due regard to the 
nature and gravity of the acts committed, the Board agreed that his exclusion from 
the status of refugee on the basis of Article 1 F of the 1951 Geneva Convention was 
justified. This is an interesting point to bear in mind since the scope of application of 
Article 1 F is similar to that of the provisions of the Stateless Convention that allows 
for statelessness to occur if the person has been involved in certain activities. 
However, the Board did acknowledge that he might be right in fearing to return to 
Tunisia where he would be punished a second time for the same crimes he had been 
convicted of in France.
Tebourski has challenged his deportation to Tunisia before the Committee against 
Torture under Article 22 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Committee has found that his 
deportation to Tunisia was a violation of Articles 3 and 22 of the Convention. 
Furthermore, the Committee has also stated that “if the exercise of domestic 
remedies is to be effective and not illusory, an individual must be allowed a 
reasonable length of time before execution of the final decision to exhaust such 
remedies. The Committee notes that in the present case the complainant was 
stripped of his nationality by the State party on 19 July 2006, the consequence of 
which was to make him an immigrant in an irregular situation and liable to expulsion. 
Despite the steps he took, the complainant was expelled just three weeks after this 
decision.” 81 This passage suggests that the measure to deprive him of his nationality 
is viewed as linked with its consequences, removal from state territory.
This case shows that the aim of the rules on loss of citizenship due to the 
commission of a terrorist act is to render the person vulnerable to expulsion. In 2006 
most persons deprived of citizenship have also been removed from France after the 
execution of their penalties. Thus this “double penalty” combined with the “efficient” 
system of administrative expulsion orders have been instrumental in making sure that 
persons accused of involvement in terrorism are removed from state territory. Some 
questions remain as to how the linkage between condemnation for criminal
81 Communication No. 300/2006, CAT/C/38/D/300/2006 11 May 2007, para. 7.4
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conspiracy in connection with a terrorist enterprise and loss of citizenship impacts the 
individual and what are the consequences for the operation of the rule of law in 
France. Bearing in mind that a condemnation for this offence is not very difficult to 
secure by the authorities (mainly because of the vagueness of its content and the low 
level of proof required), one can question whether there should be an automatic link 
made between condemnation and the possibility of losing citizenship. Should there 
be a proportionality test making sure that only those condemned for a certain number 
of years are also deprived? For the time being, the initiation of deprivation 
procedures rests with the government and it is build as an administrative procedure. 
The approval of the Council of State is the main procedural guarantee and should 
function as a safeguard against arbitrariness. A one month period in which to 
respond and bring a challenge to the government’s intention to deprive is a short 
time.
7 Final remarks
This report has examined the rules on loss of citizenship at the initiative of the state 
in France. While it has focused mainly on the last legislative changes introduced in 
2005 and 1996, it has also put forward a short sketch of French nationality 
legislation. By looking at nationality legislation and the rules on loss of citizenship 
from a historical perspective, one can argue that these rules are an expression of 
how belonging and citizenship are conceptualized at a certain moment in time.
Currently, the most important rules on loss of citizenship target either naturalized 
citizens (loss because of fraud) or dual nationals who engage in behaviours 
sanctioned by the state. Part of French politicians and authorities make a clear link 
between immigration, integration, terrorism and citizenship, which suggests that the 
state views certain categories of citizens as a risk category or at least as a category 
whose loyalty and allegiance is put under question for the first 15 years of their 
citizenship. National identity and what it means to be French are recurrent themes in 
French public space but there does not seem to be any real discussion as to how 
social cohesion is impacted by the fact that the loyalty of certain citizens is 
questioned by the state, not just in discourse but also via the legal provisions on loss 
of citizenship.
Similar to the situation encountered in the United Kingdom, European citizenship and 
human rights do not seem to penetrate the discourse. The debate has been closed 
when the Constitutional Court has declared that the rules on loss of citizenship do not 
violate any principles safeguarded by the Republic. It is also clear that French 
authorities see nationality as a sovereign matter outside the influence of the EU. At 
the same time, the number of cases of loss of French citizenship and thus, European 
citizenship has been increasing for both reasons of fraud and terrorism. It is unclear if 
this increase can be explained only by the harsh approach that the French 
government has taken towards terrorism and its securitarian approach towards many 
aspects of daily life. As mentioned before, the general approach towards loss of 
citizenship is connected from its very beginnings with issues of immigration and 
integration. As such, it is quite plausible that the perception of dual nationals as “false 
citizens” or citizens from nowhere, which has dominated the immigration debate 
throughout the 20th century, is partly responsible for the linkage made between 
immigration, dual nationals, terrorism and loss of citizenship.
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